

| REPORT

# Renewing Peacebuilding for a Disrupted World

## Geneva Incubation Space II

MAY 2026

REPORT

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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**The world is now interconnected by vulnerability before it is connected by cooperation.** That was the starting point when the Principles for Peace Foundation (P4P) and the g7+ group of countries, with support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), convened the second Geneva Incubation Space on 27–28 May 2026.

The first Incubation Space, in 2025, argued that there was a narrow but closing window to realign the existing peace infrastructure. This second gathering picked up that thread at a moment when the old order is not in crisis so much as in radical transformation. Violent conflict is rising, peacebuilding finance is falling, and the inherited architecture is too slow, too fragmented, and too procedural for the environment it now faces.

Nevertheless, the Incubation Space found that collaboration is not entirely absent, it is merely happening among different actors and in different spaces. And finance and capital is not missing, it is simply waiting somewhere else. The task now is to build the architecture that connects these currents and leverages them to promote peace, and to do so with the speed and impact that the moment requires.

**This report is organised around three linked objectives: adapting the peace and security architecture for the new environment; building the coalitions required to renew it; and capitalising on financing models that make renewal investable.** The three are inseparable – a broken system produces the wrong actors at the table, the wrong actors produce inadequate financing, and then misaligned financing reproduces a failing system.

Across all three objectives, one reframing recurred. In a transactional world, peace cannot be sold as moral aspiration alone. It must be shown to be enlightened self-interest, delivering reduced violence as well as food security, stable energy, and market confidence. Ultimately, renewal will not come from inside institutions that cannot disrupt themselves; it will come from coalitions of the willing built at the margins, anchored in alignment on key issues and specific initiatives.

**The report therefore presents two flagship models for action that were developed during the Incubation Space: a Yemen Stabilisation and Red Sea Resilience Initiative; and a Renewable Energy Peace Prototype for Fragile States.** Together they represent a new generation of peacebuilding; one that is more political, more operational, and more connected to the incentives and capital that shape outcomes in conflict settings. Neither is merely an aspiration. Both are practical starting points for the coalitions the Incubation Space began to build. In their roles as Co-Chairs of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), the upcoming INCAF Director Level and g7+ Ministerial Level meetings can task and empower the IDPS to implement these initiatives. Time is of the essence, and the opportunity to shape the transformation awaits.

# SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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## 1. Adapting the Architecture

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1. Reposition IDPS as a problem-focused coalition-builder and innovation lab
2. Map outcome shapers absent from existing platforms
3. Rebuild peace communication strategies around enlightened self-interest
4. Treat financing and ecosystem questions as inseparable
5. Use proof-of-concept pilots to challenge siloed funding

## 2. Building Coalitions

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1. Develop a matchmaking and brokerage function within IDPS
2. Launch a structured listening programme with non-traditional actors
3. Raise the profile of IDPS as a platform for delivery
4. Engage environmental philanthropy and faith-based funding networks
5. Invest in an IDPS Secretariat that drives the agenda between convenings

## 3. Financing Peace

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1. Pilot a guarantee and risk-sharing facility for a specific solvable problem
2. Advance a g7+ solar diplomacy initiative with the EU and China
3. Build diaspora capital into the peace financing architecture
4. Scale the Palestinian Impact Initiative model to other contexts
5. Leverage Geneva as a hub for innovative finance

# INTRODUCTION

The Incubation Space is a laboratory, a space for honest diagnosis, stress-tested ideas, and the forging of coalitions able to move faster than the institutions around them. It is a deliberate process, not a one-off. The first Geneva Incubation Space, in June of 2025, identified five strategic imperatives and fed them into IDPS deliberations and policy statements that followed. What that first Incubation Space argued was that the system needed rewiring rather than another layer of coordination, and that the next twelve months would be decisive.

In the end, the world answered back with greater force. Old assumptions are breaking faster than new architecture can form, with three paradoxes now defining the operating environment. First off, **peace actors are being asked to do more with less**: more conflict, more fragility, more cascading shocks, alongside less funding and fewer platforms able to respond. Second, **the world is more connected but cooperation is declining**: the Iran War has shown with brutal clarity how a regional war becomes a global economic crisis, and how that crisis becomes a humanitarian emergency far from the frontlines. And finally, **reality is moving faster than institutions**: conflict travels at the speed of networks, capital at the speed of markets, disinformation at the speed of algorithms, while the multilateral system still moves at the speed of mandates and processes.

There is a deeper conflict dynamic to name as well. **Escalation has become an organising principle in place of strategy and diplomacy**. But force can win a phase; it cannot build legitimacy. It can impose a pause; but it cannot produce a political end state. That lesson, drawn from P4P's Middle East political dialogue convened in Geneva shortly before the Incubation Space, ran underneath all of the discussions that follow.

Ultimately, connectivity sits at the centre of this moment, and it cuts both ways. Ports, pipelines, energy grids, trade routes, and digital networks can build constituencies for peace and create incentives for cooperation. Unmanaged, the same corridors become pressure points, targets, and instruments of coercion. Connectivity can build peace, or it can transmit shock.

Against that backdrop this report offers a set of options that emerged from two days of structured discussion, AI-powered simulation, and policy design. What this Incubation Space produced is a set of ideas and coalitions to be activated, initiatives to be funded, and commitments to be honoured.



# THREE OBJECTIVES FOR THE PEACE ECOSYSTEM

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## 1. Adapting the Peace & Security Architecture for the New Environment

### Analysis

The architecture the international community relies on was built for a world in which wars could be contained, alliances could be relied upon, institutions could absorb shocks, and diplomacy would eventually catch up. Each assumption is now under acute stress. The Iran War made this visible: a regional confrontation transmitted through energy markets, trade routes, food prices, and domestic politics across every continent, leaving countries with no part in the original conflict to pay some of its heaviest costs. This is no longer exceptional. It is the new normal.

What made this assessment distinctive in the Incubation Space was that the same diagnosis arrived from multiple directions all at once. Participants from different mandates and geographies flagged distinct but related problems – rising fuel costs, funding cuts arriving without warning, coordination platforms that meet but do not deliver. And yet they converged on a shared picture; not a system that failed in one place, but one that had stopped being honest about what it is for. Institutions designed to coordinate are coordinating around the wrong things, platforms designed to include are excluding the actors already shaping outcomes, funding designed to prevent conflict arrives after it starts and in formats that cannot reach the people doing the work. As the room returned to repeatedly, the problem is not technical, it is political.

Three observations crystallised this. First, cooperation is not decreasing; it is moving and happening elsewhere. Resources, power, and coalitions are flowing, but not through the channels the traditional peacebuilding sector controls or recognises. Second, the like-minded circle has become a trap. A platform that demands full ideological alignment before engaging will always be too small for the moment. Third, speed has become a tool of power, and actors who move slowly are outmanoeuvred. Underneath all three sits a question the room named but which key actors have rarely been able to resolve – governance. Who decides, and for whom? Renewing the system means reforming its representation and accountability so that it is agile without becoming a new form of gatekeeping.

## What is Shifting

Three shifts define the moment. The first is the collapse of the logic that national or regional conflicts can be contained within set borders. Yemen's fragmentation has become a maritime security problem of global consequence, sharpened by pressure on the Strait of Hormuz. Timor-Leste has plans to cut electricity hours as disrupted gas supply pushes fuel costs beyond what its budget can absorb. South Sudan, landlocked and oil-dependent, saw export routes blocked as import costs surged. Conflict in Sudan has impacts on neighbouring countries that if continued risk the already precarious prospects for stability across the Sahel. Fragility is not a local problem that occasionally spills over but a systemic condition that travels through the global economy.

The second shift is the return of power politics and transactionalism. Longstanding alliances are under strain, as states are hedging and building issue-based alignments rather than committing to durable multilateral frameworks. The circle willing to champion multilateral peacebuilding is narrowing even as the circle shaping outcomes – Gulf states, China, Türkiye, diaspora networks, and private investors – is widening, largely outside the platforms designed to coordinate it.

The third is the speed differential: institutions that cannot respond at the speed of the crises they exist to address lose the confidence of the actors they are meant to serve. This is not an efficiency problem. It is a legitimacy problem.

## Tensions and Trade-offs

Several considerations follow for the peace and security ecosystem, donors, g7+ countries, IDPS constituencies, and regional actors. The first is whether institutional reform is the primary lever, or whether faster coalitions built at the margins are what the moment requires; as institutions rarely disrupt themselves, and the barriers to a more effective system are political, not technical. Donors' strategies continuously shift and struggle to balance their national interest with their moral proclamations; coordination remains performative; and national governments are underrepresented as shapers of the agenda.

The second is narrative and audience. The word "peace" has become politically constrained in some of the capitals that matter most. Reframing the case around self-interest – including food security, energy security, fiscal stability, migration management, market confidence – is not a dilution of principle but the condition under which principle travels. A third, related consideration is visibility: IDPS remains strikingly unknown outside the rooms where it meets. One participant noted that across three years in South Sudan it never once surfaced in conversations with ministers or ambassadors. A platform invisible to the actors it hopes to convene cannot broaden its tent.

## Recommendations

### **1. Reposition and rebrand IDPS as a problem-focused coalition-builder and innovation lab.**

Rather than coordinating actors around a single broad agenda, IDPS should identify one or two concrete, country or thematic defined problems with a direct bearing on stability. Such potential initiatives were explored during the Incubation Space and are described in detail later in this report. Crucially, the IDPS should convene a large ecosystem of actors to solve problems and focus on countries with global resonance and enough actors with a genuine self-interest in a solution.

### **2. Map who is shaping outcomes but is absent from peacebuilding platforms.**

China, Türkiye, Gulf states, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), regional banks, private investors, security actors, and diaspora networks are repeatedly identified as present in conflict-affected settings but outside the architecture. An ecosystem mapping should anchor a structured outreach strategy that begins with listening rather than requests, identifying where practical convergence is possible without forcing all actors into the same peacebuilding vocabulary.

### **3. Rebuild the communication strategy around self-interest, not moral aspiration.**

The starting point should be the reframing that converged across both days: peace as food security, energy security, fiscal stability, market confidence. The audience is not only the traditional peacebuilding constituency, it includes finance ministries, energy regulators, insurance markets, and private sector actors whose decisions already shape the stability of fragile contexts. Strategic communications brainstorming on how to carry these messages into different forums should be an early priority following this Incubation Space.

### **4. Treat the financing and ecosystem questions as inseparable.**

Every structural proposal needs a financing model to move from aspiration to implementation. The P4P Palestinian Impact Initiative (presented later in this report), illustrates the principle: a political horizon and an investable structure must be built together.

### **5. Use proof-of-concept pilots to challenge the siloed funding architecture.**

A working model with a business case and coalition backing is harder for donors to refuse on the grounds that it does not fit their silo. The flagship initiatives present later in this report fit that model, and P4P has committed to being a convenor of first choice for incubating these alongside the IDPS.

## 2. Broadening Collaboration and Building Coalitions in a Transactional World

### Analysis

There is a paradox at the heart of the current moment. The actors most needed to address fragility are increasingly present in the settings where peace must be built but not in the traditional coordination mechanisms – Gulf states investing in infrastructure and stability, China financing transport infrastructure and energy systems, diaspora networks channelling capital into communities donors can no longer reach, tech companies and private investors seeking entry points in growing economies despite conflict – and yet almost none sit inside the platforms designed to coordinate peacebuilding. The room kept returning to the same point: the problem is that the architecture for engaging the right actors does not adapt. The traditional platform was built around a like-minded circle of Western donors, UN agencies, and civil society sharing a common vocabulary and theory of change. That circle is now too small, too slow, and increasingly unrepresentative of where money and political influence actually sit.

The most pertinent reframing came from a working group in the Incubation Space focused on the collaboration architecture. The assessment was that there is partnership requiring full ideological alignment before engagement can begin, or partnership which builds off a shared interest in a specific outcome. The traditional sector has relied on the first; this moment requires the second. This is not a call to abandon principles but a recognition that principles travel only when connected to interests. The question is not whether the sector can engage with actors that do not perfectly share all of its views, but whether there is enough convergence of interest around specific problems to make collaboration possible to actually address conflict. The answer from the room was clearly yes, but only if the ecosystem does the work of finding that convergence rather than waiting for others to adopt its language.

### What is Shifting

Three shifts make this both more urgent and more tractable than it appears. The first is the fragmentation of the Western donor consensus. The USAID shutdown, the reorientation of European aid toward defence, and the broader erosion of official development assistance (ODA) signal that the era in which a small group of Western donors set the agenda and resourced the system on its own terms is ending; which makes the argument for broadening the coalition unavoidable rather than aspirational.

The second is the assertiveness of middle powers and regional actors. Countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America are not waiting to be invited; they are already mediating, investing, and shaping outcomes from Yemen and the Horn of Africa to the Great Lakes and Myanmar. Several of these actors are now more present in the capitals that matter than traditional peacebuilding platforms are. Engaging them from a posture of co-design rather than consultation is the shift the ecosystem has not yet consistently made.

The third is the changing role of the private sector, which is not monolithic. It spans impact investors, foundations, diaspora capital, faith-based funding networks, tech companies, development banks, and institutional investors with very different risk appetites. At times in this landscape there is more capital looking for a home than the sector can absorb or direct. The gap is therefore not always supply. It is the machinery to connect capital to credible, country-defined opportunities.

## **Tensions and Trade-offs**

Broadening the coalition raises considerations that cannot be sidestepped. The first is control and accountability. A wider tent means accepting that some actors arrive with different assumptions, vocabularies, and red lines. If existing coordination platforms such as the IDPS want Gulf states, Chinese actors, or private investors at the table, it must give up some control over the agenda. The safeguard should not be ideological alignment but clear purpose, transparency, conflict sensitivity, country ownership, and peace-positive outcomes.

The second is the language barrier. Western peacebuilding vocabulary, Chinese developmental peace logic, Gulf investment language, IFI risk frameworks, and diaspora priorities do not naturally meet. This is not merely a translation problem but a trust problem: actors required to adopt someone else's language before participating will not engage seriously, and IDPS and P4P have a specific role here as translators and brokers. A third consideration is sequencing; genuine engagement requires listening before designing. The risk is approaching new actors with pre-packaged asks and expecting them to sign on. Structured listening to understand priorities, incentives, and risk appetite before any ask is made is the precondition for meaningful and lasting partnership.

## **Recommendations**

### **1. Develop a matchmaking and brokerage function within IDPS.**

The gap is not the absence of actors or capital but the absence of a mechanism that connects them. A light matchmaking function linking country-defined priorities with relevant actors and financing streams (diaspora capital, private investors, tech companies, Gulf finance, Chinese development actors, IFIs, and traditional donors) would not control relationships but make opportunities visible, credible, and easier to activate.

### **2. Launch a structured listening programme with non-traditional actors.**

Rather than designing initiatives and inviting new actors to fund them, IDPS should commission structured conversations with Gulf states, Chinese actors, Türkiye, IFIs, private investors, and tech companies to understand their priorities, incentives, and red lines. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) already has upcoming convenings with private financial actors and Gulf countries scheduled that can help to serve this purpose.

### **3. Raise the profile of IDPS as a platform for delivery, not just dialogue.**

Sharpening visibility through credible ambassadors, high-profile convenings, and a clearer account of what the platform delivers is a prerequisite for attracting new actors. The g7+ Ministerial Level Meeting in September 2026 is an opportunity not only to present the action items recommended in this report but also to mobilise actors in support of them.

### **4. Engage environmental philanthropy and faith-based funding networks.**

Both were flagged as underexplored areas that warrant dedicated outreach. Environmental philanthropy overlaps naturally with the energy, food security, and resilience agenda addressed through the flagship initiatives developed during the Incubation Space. In addition, faith-based funding operates at scale in many fragile contexts but largely outside international coordination.


### **5. Invest in an IDPS Secretariat capable of driving the agenda between convenings.**

The recommendations in this report require political will and operational capacity to be delivered. A Secretariat equipped to produce timely analysis, maintain relationships with new actors, and accompany country-level processes is not an overhead cost, it is the engine without which the rest of the agenda stalls. IDPS co-chairs and donors should explore funding arrangements built for sustained delivery, not periodic outputs.

### 3. Financing Peace Initiatives that Deliver and are Investable

#### Analysis

The issue of financing has dominated the conversation around peacebuilding for the past two years. Indeed, one of the central recommendations made at the 2025 Incubation Space was related to innovative finance, and as per the graph below it was selected by this year's participants as a key issue once more.



*Results from the Live Poll of 2026 Incubation Space participants, reflecting on key recommendation areas from the 2025 Incubation Space*

This year however, the financing conversation was different from the one the sector usually has. It did not start from a gap, bemoaning how much more ODA is needed or how many programmes have been cut. It started from a provocation – the landscape is saturated. There is more capital looking for a home than the ecosystem can absorb or direct. The problem is not the absence of money but the misalignment between where capital sits and where it is needed, and the absence of instruments, guarantees, and intermediary structures to bridge that gap. The question shifts from “how do we get more donors to give more?” to “how do we connect the capital that already exists to the fragile settings that need it?”

Three tensions ran through the discussions. The first is short-term versus long-term. Donor cycles run one to four years; the drivers of fragility operate over decades. Communities that are told that one programme is ending and another will follow have experienced that mismatch as a form of abandonment. This is not only operational but a trust problem, and trust is the precondition for the local engagement any financing model needs.

The second is top-down versus bottom-up. Too much peace finance still flows through international intermediaries who design programmes, set indicators, measure results, and then wonder why local actors feel bypassed. A Liberia solar initiative, developed during the Incubation Space's policy sprint and described in the next section, modelled the alternative. It starts from a problem identified by local actors in a specific municipality, assembles a coalition of community organisations, local government, private investors, and diaspora capital around it, and lets the financing structure follow the locally-defined priority.

The third is immediate impact versus a long-term horizon. P4P's Palestinian Impact Initiative (PII), presented as a prototype, held both at once. It is a \$5 million pilot catalytic capital fund deploying patient equity (rather than the bank lending or private-equity financing that conventionally serves this market) into Palestinian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the West Bank. What makes it distinctive is its engine: a multi-donor donor-advised fund (DAF) that pools philanthropic grants and low-interest debt into blended, risk-tolerant capital, giving a modest amount of money real leverage and a path to scale from the pilot to a \$50 million-plus vehicle. What makes it work is that it combines a concrete, bankable, near-term instrument with a political horizon for Palestine, without which the investment would have no durable foundation.

## **What is Shifting**

Three shifts are opening new possibilities. The first is the growing availability of non-traditional capital – diaspora networks, faith-based funding, environmental philanthropy, impact investors, and Gulf sovereign wealth – most of which the sector has barely begun to engage. The simulation conducted during the Incubation Space surfaced this concretely: when a diaspora group arrived with substantial capital but strict conditions, the response that worked was not to resist the conditions but to build a government-led tendering process and a standing multi-stakeholder platform that could hold diaspora priorities alongside community, government, and business interests in a single dialogue.

The second is a growing recognition, including within development finance institutions (DFIs), that the minimum-risk, maximum-return model is not fit for fragile contexts. IFIs are the most advanced actors in developing innovative finance units and guarantee mechanisms, yet significantly underuse them. Guarantees and risk-sharing, which let public and philanthropic capital de-risk private investment rather than substitute for it, are among the most underused levers available. Piloting a guarantee facility around a specific project, for example the Liberia solar case, and building toward an adapted financing clinic within major development banks is a realistic near-term pathway.

The third is the China solar opportunity. China's solar manufacturing sector has for years been in a significant structural oversupply, producing panels at a scale its markets cannot absorb. This presents a diplomatic and economic opening the G7+ and fragile states have not yet organised to benefit, but which is explored as "solar diplomacy" in the second flagship initiative presented below. The Middle East political dialogue convened by P4P shortly before the Incubation Space reinforced the wider point: the Hormuz crisis made redundancy a security imperative, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE partly insulated by bypass infrastructure while others were far more exposed. Energy security is now a peace and resilience question, not only a market one.

## **Tensions and Trade-offs**

As we unlock other sources of capital, the question of governance still needs to be considered. The Liberia case showed both opportunity and risk. Area-based, municipality-level development can build trust and create multiplier effects across jobs, energy, food security, and stability; but it requires local political will, a conflict-sensitive view of who benefits, and a clear answer to what happens if the enabling environment deteriorates. Land tenure, community ownership, and government accountability are the foundations without which the model collapses.

Related to this was a potentially false distinction between peacebuilding and development. While a number of participants pushed back on the assumption that solar panels or food processing are not peacebuilding, the group consensus was that they could be but only if they are anchored in conflict analysis, designed around community ownership, and connected to the political economy of the context.

A third and final consideration is who carries the risk. The current architecture places most of it on those least able to absorb it, namely local organisations, community enterprises, and fragile-state governments. Guarantees, first-loss capital, and blended structures shift risk toward donors, DFIs, and foundations with greater capacity to bear it; but deploying them requires institutional flexibility and a willingness to experiment that the system does not yet consistently show.

## **Recommendations**

### **1. Pilot a guarantee and risk-sharing facility anchored in a specific solvable problem.**

Rather than designing a system-wide instrument, pilot a guarantee facility around one concrete initiative, with the Liberia area-based solar case being a strong candidate. Then use the lessons to build toward an adapted financing clinic within major development banks and foundations. Connections to global climate finance and the Global Environment Facility, flagged in the closing pledges made by participants at the Incubation Space, should be activated as part of the pilot design.

## **2. Advance a g7+ solar diplomacy initiative with the EU and China.**

The g7+ should develop a unified position (a joint request rather than a lobbying effort) asking the EU and China together to support affordable solar provision and manufacturing capacity transfer to fragile states. China's structural oversupply and the EU's foreign policy priorities create a genuine opening that a coordinated g7+ position could exploit.

## **3. Build diaspora capital into the financing architecture from the design stage.**

The simulation exercise held during the Incubation Space showed that diaspora conditions, taken seriously rather than resisted, can become the basis for a more legitimate and durable model. Government-led tendering, multi-stakeholder platforms that integrate diaspora priorities alongside community and business interests, and special purpose vehicles that provide custodianship where governance concerns would otherwise block engagement should all be built into the standard toolkit.

## **4. Scale the Palestinian Impact Initiative model to other fragile contexts.**

The instrument – a shareholder loan combining debt and equity, pooling philanthropic and low-interest capital to de-risk SME investment – is transferable. P4P, with IDPS and relevant finance actors, should explore how to adapt it for other conflict-affected settings where the same gap between available capital and investable opportunity exists.

## **5. Leverage Geneva as a hub for innovative finance to form connective tissue.**

Geneva is already home to a wide concentration of sustainable finance groups, IFIs, private capital, and multilateral networks. An innovative finance hub would therefore not be a new institution or platform, but rather an operating environment for P4P and the IDPS to explore how different forms of finance can connect to peace-positive, country-defined priorities.

# POTENTIAL FLAGSHIP INITIATIVES

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Two initiatives emerged during the Incubation Space with the clearest potential to make the IDPS more operational, more political, and more relevant to the moment. They were specific enough to be actionable, strategic enough to matter, and grounded in the coalitions this room began to build. They are presented here as flagship proposals that the IDPS can advance.

## Yemen Stabilisation and Red Sea Resilience

### The strategic case

Yemen sits at the intersection of three consequential challenges: the restoration of a viable state, a regional security environment defined by Houthi spoiling and Iranian influence, and the security of one of the world's most critical maritime corridors. The Red Sea disruptions triggered by the Iran War exposed the cost of reading Yemen as a humanitarian crisis to be managed at a distance. Its fragmentation is now a global economic vulnerability. During P4P's Middle East political dialogue the choice was framed as whether Yemen is left as a spoiler corridor or becomes a connector between the Gulf, the Red Sea, and Africa. The consistent message was that the problem is not the absence of willing actors but the absence of an architecture to connect Yemeni agency, regional interests, international support, and investment capital. This initiative is designed to build it.

### What the initiative would do

The initiative operates across three mutually reinforcing tracks. The first supports intra-Yemeni cohesion – drawing on IDPS's bridging position and the comparative experience of g7+ states that have navigated their own transitions – to help Yemeni actors arrive at regional and international tables with both a coherent national offer and investment-ready priorities. The second convenes a dedicated regional dialogue, anchored in a Gulf capital, that treats Yemen's energy and food security as political questions rather than humanitarian files, generates an innovative financing architecture, and connects state and private sector actors with a direct stake in Red Sea stability. The third shifts the international framing from Yemen as a humanitarian crisis to Yemen as a stakeholder in regional security and trade. This can be carried into OECD-INCAF, EU institutions, and the Geneva ecosystem to place the initiative on a high-level agenda and begin identifying the coalition of donors and investors needed to move it forward.

## Next steps

- P4P to support IDPS co-chairs in developing a brief concept note to present for potential political support at the upcoming OECD-INCAF Director-Level Meeting and the g7+ Ministerial-Level Meeting in July and September 2026.
- g7+ Secretariat to explore co-convening a regional dialogue on Yemen energy and food security in a Gulf or North African country with potential donors, private sector actors, and DFIs to signal early willingness to support both the intra-Yemeni accompaniment track and the financing architecture.
- IDPS to scope a peer exchange with two or three g7+ states whose transition experience is most relevant, and to engage with Gulf States, DFIs, and the Islamic Development Bank at the September OECD-DAC convening with Gulf States and DFIs.

## Renewable Energy Peace Prototype for Fragile States

### The strategic case

The Iran War exposed a structural vulnerability fragile states have long known. When the Strait of Hormuz closed, countries with deep pockets could absorb the shock; fragile states could not. They cut electricity hours, watched fuel prices eat into household budgets, and saw export routes disrupted as import costs surged. The entry point here is therefore not renewable energy as environmental aspiration but as shock absorption: a practical, investable response to the energy insecurity that compounds fragility. Community and municipal solar power reduces exposure to fuel-price volatility, creates revenue that does not depend on aid, and gives households access to electricity and fragile states a measure of economic sovereignty. As set out in the previous section, China's solar oversupply opens a diplomatic window. The policy sprint conducted during the Incubation Space provided proof of concept. The conversation started by tracing why Liberia does not produce its own furniture despite plentiful supplies of the raw materials required and a large state budget spending significant sums to purchase finished articles. Taking this missed economic opportunity and leveraging it for development could help address tensions in border areas of the country that are connected to wider regional stability. The problem holding communities back was seen as the absence of reliable energy. Therefore one of the working groups in the Incubation Space designed a municipality-level solar initiative in southeast Liberia connecting schools, marketplaces, and nascent manufacturing to community-scale solar. It is an area-based model that starts small, proves the concept, and scales.

## What the initiative would do

### Component 1: Community-scale solar in pilot municipalities

Working with g7+ states, the IDPS would identify two or three pilot municipalities (for example in southeast Liberia) involving community organisations, local government, small businesses, and diaspora investors from the outset. The financing structure should be equally grounded. Community revenue from energy surplus, private impact and diaspora capital attracted by a revenue-generating asset, and donor guarantees and first-loss capital that de-risk private investment. A multi-stakeholder council should govern deployment and serve as the conflict-sensitivity mechanism, where the question of who benefits is asked explicitly.

### Component 2: A g7+ solar diplomacy initiative with the EU and China

The g7+ Secretariat, with IDPS and African members, should develop a unified position for a joint approach to the EU and China requesting affordable panels and manufacturing capacity transfer. This would be a trade and investment proposition, not a conventional aid ask, with the g7+ as a collective market offering scale and legitimacy in exchange for technology transfer and favourable pricing. Framework agreements should be achievable within twelve to eighteen months, manufacturing transfer on a two-to-three-year horizon.

### Component 3: Guarantee and risk-sharing mechanisms

Public development banks and IFIs still significantly underuse guarantees that would let public and philanthropic capital de-risk private investment. Their constraints can be adapted, but doing so requires dedicated expertise and proof-of-concept pilots. An initiative in Liberia or another context could be the pilot. IDPS and g7+ partners, working with the EPFL's innovation labs on technology and DFIs on structure, could design a guarantee facility and build toward a broader financing clinic within major banks and foundations. Additional concrete entry points include environmental philanthropy networks, climate finance, and the Global Environment Facility. As per the analysis above, overall governance will be crucial so land tenure and enabling policy should be addressed within the guarantee design.

### Next steps

- IDPS co-chairs to develop a unified position for a joint EU-China solar diplomacy approach ahead of the September g7+ Ministerial-Level Meeting.
- IDPS Secretariat follow up on commitments made during the incubation space:
  - Liberian Mission to Geneva to scope the southeast Liberia pilot
  - EPFL innovation labs to assess technology adaptation
  - Geneva-based policy centres to develop peacebuilding proof of concept
  - P4P to leverage sustainable finance groups in Geneva
  - Alliance for Peacebuilding to engage climate finance groups
- IDPS and g7+ to engage DFIs, private sector, and Gulf actors through upcoming OECD-DAC convenings as potential anchor investors in the guarantee facility

# OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY ACTOR

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**The g7+ is the political champion and convenor, providing the mandate to act.** As a co-chair of the IDPS and grouping of conflict-affected states, it carries the legitimacy to move recommendations from paper into political processes.

- Use the September Ministerial Meeting to mobilise actors, present the report's action items, and raise IDPS's profile as a platform for delivery, not just dialogue
- Co-convene a regional Yemen energy and food-security dialogue, anchored in a Gulf or North African capital and drawing in donors, the private sector, and DFIs
- Provide a peer exchange on g7+ transition experience to support Yemeni actors to arrive at the table with a coherent national offer
- Lead the EU–China solar diplomacy ask (a joint request for affordable panels and manufacturing capacity transfer) ahead of the September Ministerial

**Donors (including INCAF) contribute funding, endorsement, and strategic vision.** They also carry risk that local actors and fragile-state governments cannot absorb alone.

- Fund an IDPS Secretariat built for sustained delivery rather than periodic outputs
- Help shape the strategic direction of the renewed IDPS and mobilise political support for it
- Endorse both flagship initiatives at the July INCAF Director-Level Meeting to give them early momentum
- Pair every proposal with a financing model, using guarantees and first-loss capital to de-risk private investment

**The IDPS Secretariat maintains the operational engine between convenings.** It turns political mandate into analysis, relationships, and delivery.

- Drive IDPS's repositioning as a problem-focused coalition-builder and innovation lab, with strategic communications reframed around self-interest
- Map the actors shaping outcomes from outside the architecture and establish a brokerage function linking them to country-defined peace priorities
- Develop concepts for both flagship initiatives and support their implementation
- Scale innovative financing models into new contexts by leveraging Geneva's unique finance ecosystem


# CONCLUSION

The three themes of this report — adapting the architecture, building coalitions, and financing peace — are symbiotic. Fixing the system requires new actors; new actors require investable opportunities; investable opportunities require a system capable of delivering them. The two flagship initiatives are designed to hold all three together, and to test whether the peace and security ecosystem can move from convening dialogue to coordinating delivery.

The Incubation Space produced a set of choices and the beginnings of the coalitions needed to act on them. What it asks of participants now is to carry that momentum into the forums where it matters, starting with high-level meetings of the OECD-INCAF and g7+ taking place in July and September of 2026. These two co-chairing bodies of the IDPS can empower and entrust its members to build coalitions of the willing around concrete problems. P4P has committed to being a convener of first choice for incubating these ideas alongside IDPS, and the participants of the Incubation Space made a series of commitments at the end of the event that feed into and go beyond the recommendations made in this report. They include dedicating their time and efforts into conducting analysis, sharing knowledge, catalysing partnerships, and mobilising political will.

The world will not pause for the current peace and security architecture to catch up. But the actors in the Incubation Space do not need to wait for the architecture either. Infrastructure is not built by waiting, it is built by those willing to break ground before the conditions are perfect, to pool resources before the framework is agreed, and to move before the moment has passed. We opened the Incubation Space by saying that the world is interconnected by vulnerability. The task now is to make it interconnected by peace.





Swiss Agency for Development  
and Cooperation SDC